In 'Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance', I provide a new argument for a natural view in distributive ethics: that the interests of the relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off, in the sense that it is more important to give some benefit to those that are worse off than it is to give that same benefit to those that are better off, and that it is sometimes (but not always) more important to give a smaller benefit to the worse off than to give a larger benefit to those better off.  I refer to this position as relative prioritarianism.  The argument uses the 'veil of ignorance' method developed by Harsanyi and Rawls, along with my work on risk in decision theory.

In slogan form, relative prioritarianism says: everyone's interests matter, but the interests of the relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off

Work in progress provides philosophical and formal support for relative prioritarianism; shows how relative prioritarianism solves some problems associated with other views in distributive ethics; and extends relative prioritarianism to a view of uncertain social distributions.